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NOTES
THE EX POST FACTO CLAUSE AND DEPORTATION
The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that the ex
2
post facto clause of the Constitution' is not applicable to deportation.
For example, in a recent case, 3 an alien was convicted under the Marihuana
Tax Act. Later, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19524 was passed
making any conviction for any offense pertaining to marihuana ground for
deportation. The alien was ordered deported under authority of the act,
and he argued that his conviction under the Marihuana Tax Act was not
ground for deportation at the time he committed the offense, and that
therefore the 1952 law was ex post facto and unconstitutional as to him.
The Supreme Court held that the act was not unconstitutional.

3.

U.S. Const., Art. I, Sec. 9. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed."
Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 S.Ct. 283, 68 L.Ed. 549 (1924), violator of Selective
Service Act and Espionage Act; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57
L.Ed. 978 (1913), prostitute; Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed.
911 (1954), member of Communist Party; Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 75 S.Ct.
757, 99 L.Ed. 1107 (1955), narcotics law violator; Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952), member of Communist Party.
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 75 S.Ct. 757, 99 L.Ed. 1107 (1955).

4.

U.S.C.A., Title 8, Sec. 1251.

1.
2.

[32]
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The reasoning behind the holdings in the cases is simple enough. The
ex post facto clause from earliest times has been applied only to criminal
laws and punishments, 5 and deportation, no matter how severe its consequences, is not punishment.6 It is simply a refusal by the government to
7
harbor persons whom it does not want.
As noted above, this reasoning is simple, but there have been many
throughout our history who have not agreed with it. James Madison, in
speaking of the first Alien and Sedition Act proposed in the United States,
spoke in these terms:
"...if a banishment of the sort described be not a punishment,
and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to
imagine a doom to which the name can be applied."8
Others since Madison-among them Justices Field, Brewer, Douglas, and
Black-have been unable to reconcile the view of a majority of the Supreme
Court with their own logic. Tearing a man away from his home, his
family, his friends, was, to them, probably the most severe punishment that
could be imagined. Justice Brandeis expressed it most succinctly when
he said that deportation may deprive a man "of all that makes life worth
living."9 Justice Douglas spoke of it as "punishment in the practical
sense."' 0
The ex post facto concept was known long before the Revolution."
The classic definition of an ex post facto law lists four categories:
(1) Every law that makes an action done before the passing of
the law, and which was innocent when done, criminal, and
punishes such action, (2) every law that aggravates a crime, or
makes it greater than it was when committed, (3) every law
that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment
than the law annexed to the crime when committed, (4) every law
that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less or different
the commission of
testimony than the law required at the time of
2
the offense, in order to convict the offender.'
Deportation would fall easily into one of these four categories were
it not for the fact that the Court has held that deportation is not a punishment. It may well be argued that in order to protect our country from
obvious and impending dangers in what they believed the most expedient
manner, the majority has overlooked the realities. At all events, the Court
has not overlooked them blindly; they have been seen, but the Court has
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Ibid., Note 2; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798); Johannessen v. U.S., 225 U.S. 227,
32 S.Ct. 613, 56 L.Ed. 1066 (1912).
Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S. 698, 730, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 L.Ed. 905 (1893);
Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591, 33 S.Ct. 607, 57 L.Ed. 978 (1913).
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952).
As quoted in dissenting opinion of Justice Field, Fong Yue Ting v. U.S., 149 U.S.
698, 759, 13 S.Ct. 1016, 37 LEd. 905 (1893).
Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284, 42 S.Ct. 492, 66 L.Ed. 938 (1922).
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 600, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952).
Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 2 S.Ct. 443, 27 L.Ed. 506 (1882) ; State v. Kavanaugh,
32 N.M. 404, 258 Pac. 209, 53 A.L.R. 706 (1927.)
Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386 (1798).

WYOMING LAW JOURNAL

refused to recognize them, sometimes on the ground, which seems unimpressive that they were not "writing on a clean slate"; 13 in other words, the
Court felt bound by its previous decisions. It is submitted that the reluctance to write on an unclean slate should give way to the responsibility
of protecting individual constitutional rights. The dissents to the view
that deportation does not fall into the ex post facto classification have
been eloquent, but have failed to carry the day.
The reasoning that deportation is not punishment is no respecter of
persons; it has been used indiscriminately to send across the oceans both
the dangerous alien and the penitent sinner. A look at the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 195214 indicates that once an alien has "stubbed his
toe," he is subject to deportation. The act states that:
Any alien in the United States shall, upon the order of the
Attorney General, be deported who . . . (4) is convicted of a
crime involving moral turpitude committed within five years after
entry and sentenced to confinement or confined therefore in a
prison or corrective institution for a year or more ... (6) is or at
any time has been, after entry, a member of any of the following
who are members of or affiliated
classes of aliens: ... (c) aliens
15
with the Community Party.
But if the fairness of this philosophy is questionable, is it not still
worse to apply the 1952 Act retroactively to pre-1952 activities of aliens
which were non-deportable offenses when they took place?
Assuming that an alien who has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude is an unreformed criminal, or assuming that one who became a communist - before or after 1952 - is still an ardent
and dangerous believer in the principles of the Communist Party,
even the most liberal of Americans would applaud his deportation.
Our country's leaders and legislators have the right and the duty to protect our country from dangerous enemy aliens. But let us assume that the
alien is a youth of tender years when he commits the act which puts him
in the deportable class of aliens, and that his mistake-either the crime or
the joining of the Communist Party-has been atoned for. Suppose he has
served his sentence for his offense or has rejected the Communist doctrine
and for a number of years has led an honorable and worthy life. The
present immigration law makes no provision for forgiveness; he becomes
automatically deportable. It is even more severe than its predecessors,
which made the criminal conviction or membership in the Communist
Party mere counters to be weighed by administrative officials in determining whether the alien was an "undesirable resident" and therefore to be
6
deported.'
By supporting the 1952 Act the Supreme Court is agreeing with Con-

13. Valvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530, 74 S.Ct. 737, 98 L.Ed. 911 (1954).
14.
15.
16.

U.S.C.A., Title 8, Sec. 1251.
Ibid., Note 14.
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 502, 75 S.Ct. 757, 766, 99 L.Ed. 1107 (1955).
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gress that "once a sinner, always a sinners." This view, as pointed out by
Mr. Justice Douglas, is foreign to our philosophy.' 7 The principles of
forgiveness and redemption are too firmly embedded in our democratic
philosophy for us to admit that there is no return for those who have
erred.' 8
There is one argument, especially applicable to aliens who have entered
the United States since 1920, which would take the deportation laws not
only out of the class of ex post facto legislation, but entirely out of the
class of retrospective laws. 19 The argument proceeds along this line: An
impression of retroactivity results from reading as a new and isolated
enactment what is actually a continuation of prior legislation. Congress
has, it is said, during all the years since 1920, maintained a standing admonition to aliens, on pain of deportation, not to become members of any
organization which advocates the overthrow of the United States government
by force. This seems to be a rather forceful argument. But viewing the
1952 Act in the light of past acts, it can readily be seen that the "punishment" has been increased. As pointed out above, under prior acts, convictions or joining the Communist Party after entry were mere factors to
be considered and could possibly be offset by evidence of reformation to
convince the administrative official that the alien is not an "undesirable
residents." Under the 1952 Act, if the alien has fallen into one of the
deportable classifications, he is conclusively presumed to be undesirable,
and must be deported.
In summary, it is submitted that, for all practical purposes, deportation
is punishment and should fall within the prohibition of the ex post facto
clause. It is clear that our laws must be strong and effective to enable our
leaders to protect our government and institutions from dangerous aliens.
At the same time, we must be careful lest, in an effort to safeguard our
institutions and principles, we do not blindly destroy them. We can pass
laws which do not take on the character of ex post facto legislation but
which are nevertheless strong enough to accomplish the purpose. We should
punish man for what he presently is, not for what he once was, or what he
20
once believed in.
The constitution places a ban upon all ex post facto laws. There are
no exceptions or qualifications. 21 The prohibition is not restricted to
citizens-it includes both citizens and aliens.22 In this respect it is the
Constitution of the alien as well as of the citizen.
BILL
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Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 598, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952).
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 601, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952).
Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 593, 72 S.Ct. 512, 96 L.Ed. 586 (1952).
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